Abstract: Researchers identified a methodology for obtaining the incremental societal costs and benefits for a variable pricing project and applied that methodology to the State Route 91 ͑SR-91͒ Express Lanes in California. This is the longest running variable pricing project in the United States and, as such, it provided useful historical data and trends upon which to estimate benefits and costs. This analysis found that the incremental societal benefits of the SR-91 Express Lanes exceeded costs for the time period considered. A companion paper that examines the benefits and costs of the QuickRide high occupancy/toll lane program found similar results. However, the magnitudes of the differences in benefits and costs were dramatically different for the two projects, indicative of their relative sizes and the numbers of travelers impacted. On SR-91, tens of thousands of travelers were impacted on a daily basis where QuickRide's impact was limited to approximately 400 travelers per day. Interestingly, the benefit-cost ratios of the two projects were similar, both between 1.5 and 1.7.
Introduction
This paper is a companion paper to "Benefit-cost analysis of variable pricing projects: QuickRide HOT lanes" ͑Burris and Sullivan 2006͒. That paper includes an introduction to value and variable pricing, a brief explanation of benefit-cost analysis ͑BCA͒ methodology in transportation, and a detailed examination of the BCA methodology as it applies to variable pricing projects. This paper does not include these introductory topics, but rather focuses on examining the incremental societal benefits and costs of the State Route ͑SR͒ 91 Express Lanes. This paper also details where this BCA differs from the analysis outlined in the companion paper.
SR-91 Express Lanes
The California SR-91 Express Lanes run 10 mi ͑16 km͒ in the freeway median between the State Route 91/State Route 55 junction in Anaheim and the Orange/Riverside County Line ͑see Fig. 1͒ . The toll facility has two lanes in each direction, separated from four adjacent general purpose lanes ͑GPLs͒ by a "soft" barrier consisting of a painted buffer with plastic pylons. It is an express facility with no intermediate exits or entrances. Except for motor homes and buses, heavy vehicles and vehicles towing trailers are prohibited. All tolls are collected electronically, using "Fastrak" transponders compatible with the other toll facilities in California. Variable toll levels are used to manage the Express Lanes to ensure that traffic remains free flowing.
The Express Lanes were built in one of the most heavily congested corridors in California. Before the lanes opened in December 1995, 20-40 min peak period delays were typical. Initially, adding two more lanes in each direction dramatically reduced delays on the parallel GPLs to less than 10 min. Heavy GPL congestion subsequently returned and by 2000 traffic congestion and delays on the GPLs approached the levels experienced before the toll lanes opened. Auxiliary lane improvements to partly mitigate the increased congestion were implemented in early 2004 and other such improvements are planned.
A second major toll facility, the publicly operated Eastern Toll Road ͑ETR͒, opened in October 1998. This facility operates in direct competition with the SR-91 Express Lanes for traffic between Riverside County and the major employment centers southwest of SR-91 ͑see Fig. 1͒ . ETR tolls vary with distance traveled but not by time of day. In 1999, the highest SR-91 Express Lanes peak period toll was $3.50, similar to the original ETR toll of $3.25 for comparable trips. As demand increased over time, SR-91 Express Lane peak period tolls have risen to approximately twice the corresponding ETR tolls. Off-peak SR-91 tolls have remained approximately half the level of the ETR tolls. Unlike the SR-91 Express Lanes, the ETR accepts tolls paid using either Fastrak or cash, with a discount for electronic payment. These travel options ͑SR-91 freeway, SR-91 Express Lanes, and the ETR, the latter two presenting dramatically different toll options͒ result in quite complex route and time of day choices for travelers.
The four-lane SR-91 express facility was originally constructed for approximately $134 million as a private for-profit investment. In January 2003, a public agency, the Orange County Transportation Authority ͑OCTA͒, purchased the operating franchise for $207.5 million. To date, the OCTA has generally followed operating and tolling policies similar to the original private operator. The main exception is that HOV vehicles with three or more persons, who paid no tolls during the first 2 years of operation ͑1996 and 1997͒ once again pay no tolls under OCTA management, except between 4 and 6 p.m. eastbound when they pay 50% of the regular toll. Under private operator management, between 1997 and 2003, HOV-3+ users paid 50% of the regular toll at all times.
The SR-91 Express Lane toll structure is complex, varying by hour, by day, and by travel direction across 20 different toll levels from $1.05 to $6.25 ͑in late 2004͒. The peak toll charged eastbound during the heaviest Thursday and Friday afternoon hours ͑$6.25͒ is 2.5 times the $2.50 peak toll charged in 1995. Periodic toll adjustments prevent congestion in the express lanes in the face of continuing growth in corridor travel demand. There also exists a "91 Express Club" where frequent users pay a flat $20 monthly fee for a $1 discount on each trip, resulting in nearly toll-free travel during the nighttime.
SR-91 Benefits
User benefits were estimated using an evaluation framework and traffic model calibrated to data from the SR-91 Express Lanes Impact Study conducted during 1994-1999 ͑Sullivan 2000͒. These data include traffic volumes on the SR-91 Express Lanes, the SR-91 GPLs, and the ETR; vehicle speeds from loop measurements and test car runs; roadside observations of vehicle occupancies; and surveys with travelers which provided demographic, origin-destination, and choice data. Collision trends were also monitored but showed no significant differences between the express lanes and the free lanes, so potential safety benefits were not considered in this analysis. Benefits were calculated for the 10 year period from January 1996 to December 2005. Estimates reflect actual field measurements for 1996 through 1999, and were estimated for 2000-2005 based on observed trends. The basic benefit-cost methodology is explained in detail in the companion paper ͑Burris and Sullivan 2006͒.
Although a commuter rail line and an express bus line both operate in the SR-91 corridor, total public transit ridership in the corridor amounts to less than 1% of the highway traffic, and therefore was not considered in the benefit-cost analysis.
A result of the State's decision to award the original SR-91 Express Lane franchise to a private operator was that four lanes of new capacity were created several years earlier than would otherwise have been financially possible. Had this not occurred, it is likely that four nontolled HOV lanes would eventually have been constructed. On the other hand, there existed some anti-HOV sentiment in the region and four new GPLs might have been constructed instead. Given this history, the alternatives for the present benefit-cost analysis were defined as follows:
• Base Case-construct two new GPLs in each direction; • Alternative 1-construct two variable toll express lanes in each direction; and • Alternative 2-construct two HOV 2+ lanes in each direction.
Alternative 1 is what actually happened. In all three cases, the improved facility was assumed to have six lanes in each direction.
Additional assumptions were needed to carry out the analysis. The most important are • All alternatives were equal in length and built in the same location. This is critical, since conditions at the eastern terminus of the highway section, at the Riverside County line, created a severe bottleneck resulting in substantial p.m.-peak queuing and delays in the GPLs; • All alternatives entered service at the time the Express Lanes actually opened, in December 1995. Relative to the Base Case, this substantially underestimates the early benefits of Alternative 1 ͑express lanes͒ and overestimates the early benefits of Alternative 2 ͑HOV lanes͒, since reconstruction for the Base Case and HOV facility alternatives could not actually have occurred until several years later, due to financial constraints; • The Eastern Toll Road, which opened in October 1998, competed in a similar manner with all alternatives; and • Calculated user benefits were limited to only the typical weekday afternoon period defined as 2:30-7:30 p.m. in the eastbound ͑p.m.-peak͒ direction. The impacts of congestion during this time period dwarfed all other time periods due to high traffic volumes and the bottleneck at the county line. Obviously, not including a.m.-peak and off-peak traveler benefits underestimated the total benefits of the alternatives.
Value of Travel Time Savings
Trends in traffic volumes were based on observed counts for the 1996-1999 period. The observed average annual traffic growth rate of 1.1% was used to forecast unconstrained corridor demand for 2000-2005 for all alternatives. Adjustments to unconstrained traffic volumes due to delays, diversions, and tolls were determined by an iterative corridor traffic model with the following features.
• Unconstrained traffic demands were disaggregated to 1 h time increments from 3 to 7 p.m., straddled by half-hour increments for 2:30-3:00 and 7:00-7:30 p.m. Demand was estimated separately for single occupant vehicles ͑SOV͒, HOV-2, and HOV-3+ components of traffic. • Delays were modeled using a simple deterministic queuing ͑arrival-departure curve͒ analysis, using capacity values of 2,150 vehicle/h/lane ͑vphpl͒ for GPLs ͑2,300 vphpl after 2003, due to an assumed improvement to the eastbound auxiliary lane͒ and 1,900 vphpl for the express lanes and HOV lanes. These capacity values were calibrated to the observed 1996-1999 traffic conditions. ͑Note that in reality eastbound auxiliary lane improvements will not happen until after 2005.͒ • Congestion-constrained traffic was adjusted using a travel time elasticity value of −0.38, a value adopted as representative of short-term elasticities based on recommendations made for the Federal Highway Administration ͑FHwA͒ HERS model ͑Lee 2002͒. Elasticity-induced traffic changes were estimated for different alternatives using the proportional changes in travel times relative to the entire original trips. This was done by integrating along empirical total trip travel time distributions for the different vehicle occupancies, which were assumed to remain constant. • Per vehicle travel time benefits for induced traffic ͑or traffic lost due to the additional perceived costs of congestion͒ were evaluated as half the travel time benefits to continuing traffic, in accordance with the consumer surplus principle.
• Unconstrained HOV 2+ and HOV 3+ traffic during 1996-1999 was observed to be 19 and 7.4% of total traffic, respectively. Generally 70% of HOV traffic was observed to use HOV lanes where available. These percentages were assumed to remain constant over the entire analysis period.
• Travelers' perceived values of travel time in dollars per vehicle-hour were assumed to follow a lognormal probability distribution ͑Fig. 2͒. In its cumulative form this distribution was found to provide a good fit to 1997 data representing willingness to pay tolls for each of the SOV, HOV 2, and HOV 3+ components of SR-91 traffic. The average implied values of time ͑VOT͒ observed in the data were $13.36, $15.65, and $17.67 per vehicle-hour for SOV, HOV 2, and HOV 3+ vehicles, respectively. However, the VOT used in the evaluation of the express lanes option depended on toll-paying behavior. The average VOT for travelers in vehicles of each occupancy type was determined by weighing each value of time, usually in one-dollar increments, by the corresponding area under the pertinent lognormal curve. For travelers choosing to pay tolls, the VOT was the weighted average to the right of the value implied by the current toll, which is the toll divided by the amount of time saved. Similarly, the VOT for non-toll-paying users was calculated as the weighted average under the lognormal curve to the left of the implied value of time. ͑A sensitivity analysis of this critical assumption appears below.͒ • Using similar logic, the pertinent lognormal distribution of VOT was used in the traffic model to estimate the proportion of each vehicle occupancy component of traffic that would choose to pay the toll, based on the current toll value and the amount of GPL delay ͑potential time saved͒. A damping factor was used to reflect the fact that some SR-91 travelers did not have transponders and therefore were not permitted to use the express lanes. Observations from the 1996-1999 period showed that, on a given day in the SR-91 corridor, 54, 38, and 15% of SOV, HOV 2, and HOV 3+ traffic, respectively, did not have transponders.
• The model did not explicitly consider the possibility that traffic responded to congestion by shifting time of day or travel mode, other than through effects modeled implicitly using travel time elasticity. This is justified by research in the SR-91 corridor that demonstrated that route shift effects ͑pay toll or not pay toll͒ have been the dominant outcome from providing the express lanes option, while time of day shifts and mode shifts have been negligible in comparison ͑Yan et al. 2002͒. The presence of the ETR was an inhibiting factor with regard to traffic growth on the SR-91 express lanes, suggesting that Express Lane benefits were less than what they would have been if the ETR did not exist. On the other hand, traffic entering from the ETR significantly worsened the congestion in the bottleneck located near the eastern end of the express lanes, leading to increased benefits from the additional travel time saved by users of the express lanes. In the analysis, these rather complex effects of the ETR on benefits were captured in the empirical traffic trends used in the calculations.
It should be noted that the physical constraints and traffic conditions found in the SR-91 Express Lanes corridor are unique to this setting. These conditions may not be similar to other corridors, and the traffic model used in this evaluation cannot be assumed to apply elsewhere. Nevertheless, the approach taken to this analysis applied generally accepted principles and the conclusions should help to inform discussions regarding the economic efficiency of applying value pricing elsewhere.
The constrained traffic volumes estimated by the traffic model, which were the basis for calculating user travel time benefits, appear in Fig. 3 . The analysis resulted in some interesting dynamics with regard to the traffic induced or suppressed by applying the travel time elasticity: • From 1996 through 1998, the Base Case scenario ͑two additional general use lanes͒ was associated with inducing 2,000-3,000 additional p.m.-peak trips compared to the two managed lane scenarios ͑about a 5% difference͒; and • During 2002 to 2003, when delays in the GPLs were by far the worst, the express lane scenario was associated with roughly 2,000 fewer trips, due to the elasticity effect of free-lane congestion in combination with express lane tolls. In other years, when congestion was not as bad, the three scenarios accommodated similar traffic volumes. A summary of p.m.-peak eastbound travel time benefits, the daily delay, dollar benefits, and the estimated annual benefits is shown in Table 1 . The annual values of travel time saved ͑VTTS͒ benefits are based on 260 p.m.-peak periods per year. The annual VTTS benefits were converted to total net present value ͑NPV͒ for the 10-years period using the 3.1% discount rate. Based on this analysis, the express lanes had $171.3 million in total discounted VTTS benefits, while the dual-HOV 2 lane option had a $15.6 million disbenefit, relative to the Base Case scenario.
Note that the relative delay ͑in vehicle-hours͒ varied substantially for the different scenarios in different years. The express lanes option had the least delay in only one year ͑2003͒ when congestion was the worst; while the Base Case option had the least delay for five of the remaining nine years, although four of the five were early ramp-up years when providing two extra lanes of new unrestricted capacity dominated the comparisons. The relative total delay advantage enjoyed by the dual-HOV lane scenario in the late, generally more congested years appears to be due to a capacity advantage at the bottleneck located at the end of the facility, where less weaving was needed to sort out the different traffic streams continuing to downstream highways, compared to the express lanes option.
The large VTTS benefits attributed to the express lanes, and the negative benefits of the HOV-lanes option reflect the result of the approach used in this analysis to quantify travelers' values of time ͑VOT͒. The advantage of the express lanes arose from that facility's unique ability to save substantial amounts of time for travelers with high VOT, while travelers with low VOT experienced most of the delays. Empirical experience with the Express Lanes made it possible to separate the traveling public for analysis into high-VOT and low-VOT groups, based on their revealed behavior when given the opportunity to pay tolls to avoid delay. The other scenarios examined here imposed significant travel delays on travelers with high VOT ͑high VOT SOV travelers in the HOV-lane case, and all travelers with high VOT in the Base Case͒, thus generating substantial disbenefits for the two nonexpress lanes alternatives.
A sensitivity analysis was performed to explore the importance of the VOT methodology to these results. Although it seems reasonable to assert that on a given day under given traffic conditions, people who chose to pay tolls to avoid delay revealed a higher current VOT than those who did not, there may be extenuating circumstances that prevented some high-VOT travelers from paying tolls. This is related to the fact that a particular person may have very different values of time on different days, depending on the urgency of his or her daily commitments. This is supported by the observation from travel surveys during the SR-91 Impact Study that many people did not use the Express Lanes every day, but only when the situation warranted. Since to use the SR-91 Express Lane travelers must register and carry a transponder, probably some unregistered travelers, whose usual VOT did not justify becoming a registered Express Lanes customer, occasionally made trips on the GPLs even though their VOT for those occasional trips were high enough to warrant paying the toll. Also, for various reasons, some registered customers may sometimes fail to carry their transponders. Consequently, it is likely that a fairly small fraction of travelers who did not pay tolls on a given day actually had VOT in excess of the threshold required to justify paying the tolls.
In the original analysis, the implied average VOT for nontoll payers under typical p.m.-peak conditions ͑a 30 min delay͒ was found to be $5.80/vehicle-h. Recognizing that the overall average VOT for all commuters, including toll payers and nontoll payers together, was just over $14/vehicle-h, a rough side calculation was made to examine the sensitivity of the total discounted net present value ͑NPV͒ of VTTS benefit for the express lanes scenario compared to the base case, with the VOT for nontoll payers in the express lanes scenario ranging from $5.80 to $14/vehicle-h. ͑For consistency in this approximation, the average VOT for delay in the Base Case was assumed always to be $14.58/vehicle-h, the average for all travelers in the Base Case. Due to these simplifying assumptions, the results of this approximation are therefore different from the corresponding results shown in Table 1 where the average VOT varied year by year.͒ The outcome appears in Fig. 4 .
As the average VOT for nontoll paying travelers in the express lanes scenario increased above its original value of $5.80/ vehicle-h, the NPV of VTTS for the express lanes option decreased rapidly. Assuming that 10-20% of people on a given day do not pay the tolls but have a VOT in excess of the threshold that would justify paying, that implies an average VOT for nontoll paying travelers in the $7.50 to $9.50/vehicle-h range, resulting in a loss of $35-$75 million in estimated VTTS benefits compared to the original analysis. The overall net present worth for the express lanes option became negative at the VOT for nontoll payers of $8.56/vehicle-h, about halfway through this range.
Fuel Usage
Both fuel use and emissions were estimated using values of average travel speed through the 8.5-mi ͑14-km͒ portion of the facility where traffic congestion was normally the worst. Over the remaining portion of the facility it was assumed that there was a negligible difference in fuel used and vehicle emissions between the three scenarios. Average delays from the traffic model were used to calculate average speeds for the GPLs. For the express lanes and the dual-HOV lanes, free flow conditions ͓65 mph ͑105 kph͔͒ were assumed to exist at all times.
The fuel savings benefits are summarized in Table 2 . The higher speeds achieved by significant numbers of vehicles using the express lanes and the dual-HOV lanes resulted in fuel savings for those options being negative for 8 of the 10 years, and the overall net present value of fuel use was also negative.
Emissions
Using the average speeds described previously, the California EMFAC model was used to estimate emission rates for the afternoon analysis period, 2:30-7:30 p.m., in the heavy traffic direction ͑eastbound͒. Estimated daily afternoon emissions, in metric tons per day, for the four major pollutant species are shown in Table 3 . The corresponding dollar-benefit summary appears in Table 4 . For the speed ranges typical of SR-91, the higher speeds in the managed lanes generally produced higher emissions than traffic in the congested free lanes. Consequently, emission "benefits" were negative in all but the first 2 years.
SR-91 Costs
The start-up costs of the SR-91 alternatives were estimated using judgment based on information from annual reports produced by the private operator of the SR-91 Express Lanes. The financial impacts of the 2003 sale of the operating franchise to OCTA were ignored. The total $134 million original project cost was broken into components. Design and financing costs were ignored because they would be similar for all scenarios. Original leasehold and equipment costs for the SR-91 Express Lanes were $82 million. It was assumed that 60% of these costs ͑$49.2 million͒ were for basic infrastructure elements common to all three alternatives. The cost elements corresponding to the remaining $32.8 million, which were not needed for the Base Case, are listed in Table 5 for the other two alternatives. Note that the initial costs to the SR-91 Express Lanes private operator were unusually low for urban freeway construction, approximately $3.35 million per lane-mile ͑$2.1 million per lane-km͒ due to the fact that the land was already owned, environmental clearances were already obtained, and earthwork for median construction was mostly in place. Costs for the HOV lanes alternative were based on those of the Express Lanes after eliminating inapplicable components and reducing the cost of enforcement zones based on judgment. All initial costs were assumed to occur in 1995 ͑the base year for this analysis͒.
The incremental annual facility costs associated with the two alternatives, relative to the Base Case, are shown in Table 6 . The costs of the SR-91 Express Lanes included operation of a dedicated Traffic Management Center, a dedicated freeway service patrol, administration of the toll collection system, extra enforcement, public relations, and other management functions. These values were adapted from an annual report of the private operator. Incremental annual facility costs for the dual-HOV lanes alternative only included the extra enforcement cost, assumed to be two-thirds of the express lanes' because the enforcement required would be less complex. Costs for road maintenance were assumed to be the same for all three alternatives and were excluded. Annual costs were converted to net present value using the 3.1% discount rate.
SR-91 Summary
The total discounted benefits of the SR-91 Express Lanes for the 10-year analysis period exceed the total discounted costs by over $50 million ͑see Table 7͒ . As expected, user travel time benefits dominated most other considerations. The dual-HOV lanes alternative did not compare well against either the express lanes alternative or the Base Case, primarily because this alternative subjected many drivers of single occupant vehicles with high values of time to substantial delays. The difference is due to the opportunity provided through pricing to let high value of time trips avoid delay, while leaving primarily low value of time trips subject to congestion delay.
It should be emphasized that having a high value of time for a particular trip is not the same thing as having a high income. Although our surveys showed that high-income commuters use the SR-91 Express Lanes on average more than low-income commuters, low-income people also make many express lane trips, and high-income commuters often choose to endure congestion delays. This reflects the fact that most people engage on different occasions in both low value of time and high value of time travel, across income groups. Although high-income people generally make a higher proportion of high value of time trips, they have no monopoly on them.
A number of very conservative assumptions were made in this analysis, including the assumption that the Base Case and dual-HOV lane alternatives could have been implemented in 1995, and the exclusion of benefits which occurred outside the p.m.-peak period and other than in the eastbound direction. Clearly, if these simplifying assumptions had not been made, the estimated economic payoff of the SR-91 Express Lanes would have been higher. The many years of improved travel conditions that occurred because the private company was able to construct the express lanes long before public money would have become available clearly provides a large additional benefit not considered in these comparisons. 
Conclusions
This analysis of the SR-91 Express Lanes, one of the pioneering variable pricing projects, found that the incremental societal benefits exceeded costs for the time period considered. A companion paper investigated these benefits and costs for the QuickRide HOT lanes, with the same conclusion ͑Burris and Sullivan 2006͒. The magnitude of the differences in benefits and costs are dramatically different for the two projects, indicative of their relative sizes and the numbers of travelers impacted. On SR-91, tens of thousands of travelers were impacted on a daily basis where QuickRide's impact was limited to approximately 400 travelers per day. Interestingly, the benefit-cost ratios of the two projects were similar, both between 1.5 and 1.7. Although this similarity occurs for these two projects, other value pricing projects are likely to yield different results.
The analysis also found that the majority of benefits were derived from travel time savings. Therefore value of time ͑VOT͒ was a key factor in determining total benefits. Although a great amount of research has been done to estimate VOT, the bulk of it has been through stated preference surveys, often analyzing different mode choices. More research is needed on VOT derived from operational projects, particularly ones where the toll varies by time of day. As was done in this case, variable tolls allow researchers to better quantify both the VOT and the resulting benefits derived by travelers at different times of day. More such data may be derived from the existing variable pricing projects and, in turn, help quantify the benefits of future variable pricing projects.
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